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SONNER V. PREMIER NUTRITION CORP. 
Federal Common Law’s Limitation of California UCL and 
CLRA Equitable Restitution  
Ruth Dapper, Esq. & Bryce Young, Esq.* 
INTRODUCTION 
When sitting in diversity jurisdiction, must a federal court apply 
federal equitable principles when deciding state law claims, even if 
state law may provide a different outcome?  That was the question 
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the 
case of Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp.1  Although the Ninth Circuit’s 
published opinion relies on “seventy-five years” of unchanged law,2 the 
opinion joins a long list of cases that continue to help clarify the tenets 
from Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins3 and inform the courts and 
practitioners on the relationship between state and federal authority 
in diversity jurisdiction. 
In short, the Ninth Circuit in Sonner confirmed that “a federal 
court must apply traditional equitable principles before awarding 
restitution [available under state law].”4  The reasoning for this 
outcome is straightforward: “[S]tate law can neither broaden nor 
restrain a federal court’s power to issue equitable relief.”5  And this 
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 *  Bryce Young is a litigator at Duane Morris LLP.  Ruth Dapper is a litigator at DLA 
Piper LLP (US).  Bryce and Ruth are based in San Diego, California. 
 1 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020).  This amended opinion was issued after the panel 
denied the petition for rehearing.  Id. at 837. 
 2 Id. at 841. 
 3 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 4 971 F.3d at 841. 
 5 Id. 
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outcome has serious teeth—an equitable remedy (and the attendant 
monetary amounts) available under state law may be barred by federal 
equitable principles. 
I.     CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMERS LEGAL 
REMEDIES ACT  
As relevant here, California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and 
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) are commonly invoked in 
consumer litigation, including class actions.  The UCL prohibits 
“unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s]” and 
“unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.”6  The CLRA 
prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to 
result or that results in the sale . . . of goods or services to any 
consumer.”7  The UCL “is equitable in nature” and UCL remedies are 
“generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.”8  The CLRA has 
greater flexibility, including restitution of property, actual damages, 
punitive damages, and “[a]ny other relief that the court deems 
proper.”9 
When only equitable relief is sought, a jury trial is not appropriate 
and instead a bench trial is held.10 
II.     SONNER V. PREMIER NUTRITION CORP. 
A.   The District Court Permitted Plaintiff to Amend the Complaint to 
Remove a Prayer for Damages, Leaving Only Equitable Relief 
Sonner was filed in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California in early 2013 as a putative class action.11  
The lawsuit centered on alleged false advertising in connection with a 
dietary product.12  The action proceeded through litigation over the 
 
 6 CAL. BUS. & PRO. CODE § 17200 (West 2020).  
 7 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2020). 
 8 Chowning v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 735 Fed. App’x 924, 924 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(quoting Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2003)). 
 9 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(a)(1)–(5) (West 2020). 
 10 See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 611 F.2d 296, 307 (9th Cir. 
1979) (affirming district court’s order “concluding that since only equitable claims 
remained to be tried, trial to a jury would be inappropriate”); Nationwide Biweekly Admin., 
Inc. v. Superior Ct., 462 P.3d 461, 486 (Cal. 2020) (“For nearly a half century, Court of 
Appeal decisions have explicitly and uniformly held that actions under the UCL and FAL 
are equitable in nature and are to be tried by the court and not by a jury.”). 
 11 Mullins v. Premier Nutrition Corp., No. 13-cv-01271, 2018 WL 510139 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 23, 2018), aff’d sub nom Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 12 Sonner, 971 F.3d at 837–39 (discussing procedural history of underlying district 
court’s order). 
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course of the next few years, and, in April 2016, the district court 
certified a class of California consumers who had purchased the 
product.13 
UCL and CLRA claims were pleaded throughout the various 
iterations of the operative complaints.14  Less than two months before 
the jury trial was to begin, Plaintiff Kathleen Sonner sought to drop 
her claim seeking damages pursuant to the CLRA as an apparent tactic 
to avoid a jury trial.15  Defendant Premier Nutrition Corporation 
(“Premier”) opposed Sonner’s request to amend the complaint, 
arguing the amendment was futile because restitution under the UCL 
and CLRA cannot properly be pleaded while an adequate remedy at 
law exists (e.g., CLRA monetary damages).16  The court permitted 
Sonner to amend the complaint to remove the request for CLRA 
damages, but warned Sonner that the court would not later permit her 
to amend her complaint again in order to re-plead for CLRA 
damages.17 
Sonner filed an amended complaint removing the CLRA damages 
prayer.18  Sonner thus had two remaining claims: violation of the UCL 
 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 838 (“[W]hy would Sonner voluntarily abandon an ostensibly viable claim on 
the eve of trial after more than four years of litigation?  The answer is also obvious: to request 
that the district court judge award the class $32,000,000 as restitution, rather than having 
to persuade a jury to award this amount as damages.”); Memorandum of Plaintiff in Support 
of Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint at 6, Mullins, 2018 WL 510139 
(No. 13-cv-01271) (arguing against the court holding a jury trial due to the proposed 
amendment); id. at Exhibit B, 21 (showing proposed removal of jury demands and claim to 
damages). 
 16 See Memorandum of Defendant in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims 
for Equitable Restitution at 4, Mullins, 2018 WL 510139 (No. 13-cv-01271) (“Before a party 
can avail herself of a court’s equitable jurisdiction, she must first demonstrate that her 
remedy at law is inadequate.”); Memorandum of Defendant in Opposition to Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint at 3, Mullins, 2018 WL 510139 (No. 
13-cv-01271) (“Courts routinely recognize that equitable claims under [UCL and CLRA]—
which are the claims that would remain at issue in Plaintiff’s proposed amended 
complaint—are deficient and subject to dismissal where there is a legal remedy, such as 
monetary damages, available to the plaintiff.”). 
 17 See Memorandum of Defendant in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims 
for Equitable Restitution, supra note 16, at Exhibit B, 18.  In the transcript of the 
proceedings on the motion to amend, the court stated, “And if I grant [plaintiff’s motion 
to amend the complaint to remove the damages prayer], we are never going to hear again 
anything about a damage claim under the CLRA” and plaintiff’s counsel responded, “I 
completely agree.”  Id.  Plaintiff’s counsel then addressed that if plaintiff were able to 
amend the complaint and defendant were to successfully move to dismiss that amended 
complaint, plaintiff would then move to amend again “and presumably but maybe not be 
granted leave to amend to put back in the rest of it.”  Id.  The court responded, “I wouldn’t 
put a lot of money on that one.”  Id. 
 18  Sonner, 971 F.3d at 838. 
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and violation of the CLRA.19  As relief, her prayer included two forms 
of equitable relief: (1) equitable restitution and disgorgement and (2) 
injunctive relief.20  Sonner sought $32,000,000 as restitution 
damages—this was the same monetary amount she had requested as 
CLRA monetary damages from the prior complaint.21  With CLRA 
damages no longer pleaded in the operative complaint, the court 
vacated the jury trial.22 
B.   The District Court Determined a Claim for Equitable Restitution 
Required a Showing That No Adequate Remedy at Law Existed 
Premier moved to dismiss the new complaint’s claims for 
equitable restitution, arguing under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) and (b)(6) that Sonner needed to establish that she lacked 
an adequate legal remedy and thus could not pursue her claims of 
restitution under UCL and CLRA.23 
Reviewing Premier’s motion to dismiss under a Rule 12(b)(6) 
standard, the district court noted: “In the Ninth Circuit, the relevant 
test is whether an adequate damages remedy is available, not whether 
the plaintiff elects to pursue it, or whether she will be successful in that 
pursuit.”24  Sonner argued that, because “the UCL and the CLRA 
expressly provide a statutory right to restitution . . . , a plaintiff seeking 
relief under those statutes is not required to plead an inadequate 
remedy at law.”25  The court disagreed, concluding that the authorities 
cited by Sonner did not shed light on whether the “plaintiff may seek 
a remedy for past harm when she has an adequate remedy at law for 
that exact same past harm.”26  Rather, the court determined California 
law had not removed the inadequate remedy doctrine and then 
concluded Sonner’s choice to not “request damages does not relieve 
her from having to show that her remedy at law is inadequate.  Because 
she has not done so, and . . . is unable to do so, she may not proceed 
on her equitable claims for restitution in lieu of a damages claim.”27  
 
 19  See Memorandum of Plaintiff in Support of Motion for Leave to File Second 
Amended Complaint, supra note 15, at Exhibit B, 17–22. 
 20  Id. at Exhibit B, 21. 
 21  Sonner, 971 F.3d at 837. 
 22 Id. at 838.  
 23 Mullins v. Premier Nutrition Corp., No. 13-cv-01271, 2018 WL 510139, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 23, 2018), aff’d sub nom Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 
2020). 
 24 Id. at *2. 
 25 Id. at *3. 
 26 Id. at *4; accord Sonner, 971 F.3d at 838 (“Specifically, the district court concluded 
that claims brought under the UCL and CLRA remained subject to California’s inadequate-
remedy-at-law doctrine, and that Sonner failed to establish that she lacked an adequate legal 
remedy for the same past harm for which she sought equitable restitution.”). 
 27 Mullins, 2018 WL 510139, at *4. 
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On this ground, the court granted Premier’s motion to dismiss as to 
the equitable restitution relief and denied Sonner’s request to re-plead 
the CLRA damages.28  A few months later, the court dismissed the 
remainder of the lawsuit (solely seeking injunctive relief) and entered 
judgment with prejudice in favor of Premier Nutrition Corp.29  Sonner 
then appealed to the Ninth Circuit the order dismissing her equitable 
restitution claims.30 
C.   The Ninth Circuit Determined a Federal Court Must Apply Traditional 
Equitable Principles Before Awarding Restitution Under the UCL and 
CLRA (Even If State Law Would Provide Otherwise) 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit framed the preliminary (and 
ultimately dispositive) question before it as: “[D]o federal equitable 
principles independently apply to Sonner’s equitable claims for 
restitution or must we, as a federal court, follow only the state law 
authorizing that equitable remedy?”31  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit 
noted this was “not the basis for the district court’s decision.”32 
Sonner argued that state principles alone apply because the case 
was a diversity action and involved state statutes.33  Premier argued that 
Sonner’s claims failed under state law, but also that federal courts in 
diversity are “bound by traditional federal equitable principles.”34  
These federal principles include, Premier reasoned, the mandate that 
to successfully pursue equitable relief, the claiming party must 
establish that it lacks an adequate legal remedy.35 
To address this question, the Ninth Circuit explained the relevant 
history of the Erie doctrine.  “It has long been the province of federal 
courts sitting in equity to apply a body of federal common law 
irrespective of state law.”36  This federal common law had been 
“narrowed considerably” by the Erie doctrine, which has long held that 
“federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must follow state 
substantive law and federal procedural law when adjudicating state law 
claims.”37  To determine “whether a law is substantive or procedural,” 
courts “generally use the ‘outcome-determination test,’ which asks 
whether applying federal law instead of state law would ‘significantly 
 
 28 Id. at *5. 
 29 Answering Brief of Appellant at 4, Sonner, 971 F.3d 834 (No. 18-15890). 
 30 Sonner, 971 F.3d at 838–39. 
 31 Id. at 839. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. (citing Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139, 147 (1851)). 
 37 Id. at 839–40 (first discussing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); and 
then citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)). 
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affect’ the litigation’s outcome.”38  “Thus, the outcome of a case in 
federal court should generally be ‘substantially the same, so far as legal 
rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a 
State court.”39  Even so, “since Erie, the Supreme Court has instructed 
that a federal court’s equitable authority remains cabined to the 
traditional powers exercised by English courts of equity, even for 
claims arising under state law.”40 
In addressing the appropriate scope and use of federal common 
law principles, the Ninth Circuit drew guidance from Guaranty Trust 
Co. v. York, a Supreme Court opinion issued seven years after Erie.41  
The York Court examined whether a state statute of limitations could 
defend against a state law equitable claim.42  The York opinion 
concluded that “[e]quitable relief in a federal court is of course subject 
to restrictions,” and suggested an example of such a restriction would 
be that “a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law must be 
wanting.”43  York emphasized, therefore, that “[s]tate law cannot 
define the remedies which a federal court must give simply because a 
federal court in diversity jurisdiction is available as an alternative 
tribunal to the State’s courts.”44  In summation, York guided that 
“[f]ederal courts must therefore enforce ‘[s]tate-created substantive 
rights if the mode of proceeding and remedy [are] consonant with the 
traditional body of equitable remedies, practice and procedure.’”45 
Applying York’s principles to the present case, the Ninth Circuit 
held that “a federal court must apply traditional equitable principles 
before awarding restitution under the UCL and CLRA [because i]t has 
been a fundamental principle for well over a century that state law 
cannot expand or limit a federal court’s equitable authority.”46 
The Ninth Circuit explained federal courts must “nonetheless 
apply principles of federal common law” even if the federal application 
could result in a federal court reaching a decision that may differ from 
a state court’s treatment.47  “Even assuming California decided as a 
matter of policy to streamline UCL and CLRA claims by abrogating the 
state’s inadequate-remedy-at-law doctrine, the strong federal policy 
protecting the constitutional right to a trial by jury outweighs that 
 
 38 Id. at 839 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)). 
 39 Id. (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)). 
 40 Id. at 840 (citing York, 326 U.S. at 104–07). 
 41 See id. at 841. 
 42 Id. at 840 (citing York, 326 U.S. at 100–01, 107). 
 43 Id. (quoting York, 326 U.S. at 105) (emphasis omitted). 
 44 Id. (quoting York, 326 U.S. at 106). 
 45 Id. (citing York, 326 U.S. at 106) (last alteration in original). 
 46 Id. at 841 (“[I]n seventy-five years, the Supreme Court has never repudiated its 
statement in York—offered seven years after Erie—that state law can neither broaden nor 
restrain a federal court’s power to issue equitable relief.”).  
 47 Id. (citing York, 326 U.S. at 105–06). 
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procedural interest.”48  This outcome is necessary, concluded the 
Ninth Circuit, because, “[s]ince York, the [U.S. Supreme] Court has 
never held or suggested that state law can expand a federal court’s 
equitable powers, even if allowing such expansion would ensure a 
similar outcome between state and federal tribunals.”49 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit noted opinions from the Second, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals “mirror[ed the 
holding that] state law cannot circumscribe a federal court’s equitable 
powers even when state law affords the rule of decision.”50  Several of 
those opinions had similarly quoted and relied on York as well.51  The 
Ninth Circuit further noted opinions from the Eighth and Eleventh 
Circuit Courts of Appeals similarly agreed on the principles, albeit in 
different contexts.52 
Applying the now-decided threshold jurisdictional decision, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded “that the traditional principles governing 
equitable remedies in federal courts, including the requisite 
inadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a party requests restitution 
under the UCL and CLRA in a diversity action.”53  The Ninth Circuit 
determined “Sonner fail[ed] to make such a showing” because “the 
operative complaint does not allege that Sonner lacks an adequate 
legal remedy.”54  Moreover, “Sonner concede[d] that she seeks the 
same sum in equitable restitution as . . . she requested in damages to 
compensate her for the same past harm.”55  And she “fail[ed] to 
explain how the same amount of money for the exact same harm is 
inadequate or incomplete, and nothing in the record supports that 
conclusion.”56 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed—“albeit on alternative 
grounds” and without addressing California law—the district court’s 
 
 48 Id. at 842. 
 49 Id. at 841–42.  
 50 Id. at 843 (first citing Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners, L.P., 913 F.3d 959, 972–
73 (10th Cir. 2019); then citing SSMC, Inc., N.V. v. Steffen, 102 F.3d 704, 708 (4th Cir. 
1996); then citing Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 800, 806 (2d Cir. 
1981); then citing Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State v. Oneida Cnty, 464 F.2d 916, 922 
(2d Cir. 1972); then citing Clark Equip. Co. v. Armstrong Equip. Co., 431 F.2d 54, 57 (5th 
Cir. 1970); and then citing Hertz v. Record Publ’g Co. of Erie, 219 F.2d 397, 398 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1955)). 
 51 See id. (first citing Davilla, 913 F.3d at 972–73; and then citing SSMC, Inc., 102 F.3d 
at 708). 
 52 Id. (first citing Nat’l P’ship Inv. Corp. v. Nat’l Hous. Dev. Corp., 153 F.3d 1289, 
1291–92 (11th Cir. 1998); and then citing Aviation Supply Corp. v. R.S.B.I. Aerospace, Inc., 
999 F.2d 314, 316 (8th Cir. 1993)). 
 53 Id. at 844. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
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dismissal of Sonner’s claims for equitable restitution.57  “Regardless of 
whether California authorizes its courts to award equitable restitution 
under the UCL and CLRA when a plain, adequate, and complete 
remedy exists at law, we hold that federal courts rely on federal 
equitable principles before allowing equitable restitution in such 
circumstances.”58 
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Sonner’s request to amend the 
complaint to reallege CLRA damages, particularly since Sonner 
“strategically chose” to drop them and the district court had warned 
her of the risks.59 
III.     SONNER’S IMPLICATIONS AS TO STATE LAW CLAIMS IN FEDERAL 
COURT 
The Sonner opinion accords with other district court decisions in 
the Ninth Circuit that have dismissed UCL and CLRA claims—
including at the pleadings stage—where a party failed to demonstrate 
a lack of adequate remedy at law,60 and resolves this issue to the extent 
there was potentially confusing language among district courts.61  
Notably for federal courts and practitioners, Sonner reaffirms that 
parties cannot pursue equitable restitution if an adequate remedy 
exists, even if not originally pleaded.  Thus, while Sonner abandoned 
the claim for monetary damages via a motion to amend the complaint, 
that vehicle was not critical to the determination that a federal court 
must apply federal common law to assess the availability of an adequate 
remedy at law before awarding equitable restitution.  Instead, the 
Ninth Circuit focused on whether such an adequate remedy at law 
exists (whether it has been claimed previously or not).  As such, 
practitioners will want to consider Sonner when determining (1) which 
claims to pursue, (2) whether a jury or bench trial is preferred, and (3) 
grounds to address in dispositive motion practice.  Assuredly, the 
Sonner decision will be on the minds of opposing counsel and will 
provide a framework for future courts resolving these issues. 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 845. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See, e.g., Mullins v. Premier Nutrition Corp., No. 13-cv-01271, 2018 WL 510139, at 
*2 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2018) (citing numerous orders from the Northern District of 
California dismissing equitable claims, including those for restitution, where plaintiff had 
failed to establish that no adequate remedy at law was available), aff’d sub nom Sonner v. 
Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 61 Id. at *3–4 (analyzing Plaintiff’s arguments and authority contending “she need not 
establish an inadequate remedy at law”). 
